Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
for an
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)

January 2012

I. VISION

A U.S. homeland security infrastructure with a coordinated and operational system of laboratory networks that provides timely, high-quality, and interpretable results for early detection and effective consequence management of acts of terrorism and other events, such as natural disasters and disease outbreaks, requiring an integrated laboratory response.

II. STATEMENT OF NEED

The United States needs a system of laboratory networks capable of integrated and coordinated response to incidents involving:

- Multiple types of microbes (e.g., emerging infectious disease), agents (e.g., chemical, biologic, and radiological) or mixed or unknown agents, where sampling, testing, interpretation of results, and response must be closely coordinated;
- Multiple matrices, where laboratory testing is needed in multiple sample types (e.g., human clinical, environmental, food, plant, and animal) and where there is overlap in the need for methods, training facilities, equipment, reagents, and staff to carry out the testing;
- More than one sector or segment of the Nation (e.g., humans, animals, plants, food, and the environment) or more than one type of laboratory (e.g., screening/sentinel, confirmatory, forensic, and definitive reference); and
- Multiple phases of incident management (e.g., monitoring, emergency response, remediation/recovery, and forensic investigations).

The establishment of an integrated laboratory response capability could significantly reduce vulnerabilities to infectious diseases, and chemical, biological, and radiological contamination events, and reduce the adverse consequences of these events on the public health, food supply, and agriculture sectors. The ability to mitigate the effects of an event within these sectors also has a beneficial impact on our Nation's ability to respond to, and recover from, natural disasters and pandemics and to deter future acts of terrorism.

The goals of early detection and integrated consequence management are heavily dependent on shared understanding of the reliability and accuracy of results. Jointly accepted performance standards for test methods, reagents, proficiency testing and quality assurance, laboratory accreditation, and results reporting and sharing are desirable wherever possible. Standard methods and procedures can serve the integration objectives

of the (Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) (e.g., results that support action thresholds for both food safety and human health) by producing efficiencies of scale (e.g., stockpiling of reagents, triaging specimens for surge capacity) and by ensuring performance comparability among network assay methods.

An integrated nationwide consortium of laboratory networks supports the delivery and sharing of timely, high-quality, and interpretable results through inter-network communication and information sharing; lab resource optimization through clarification and coordination of responsibilities; and strategic planning.

Additionally, an integrated consortium of laboratory networks creates an inclusive forum for Federal leadership to share ideas, work collaboratively, and build relationships that support a more effective integrated response during emergencies. This integrated system is intended to promote effective joint response to multiple types of events, including terrorist attacks, natural and man-made disasters, and disease outbreaks among the human, animal, and plant populations. The following examples highlight the necessity of an integrated response capability during emergencies and demonstrate the importance of laboratory networks working together:

- Response to the *E. coli* O157 outbreak in spinach involved interactions between the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) and the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). A rapid screen methodology was harmonized for use by both networks for the outbreak.
- The response to the melamine contamination of bulk imported plant products for pet food required coordination among the FERN, the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and other networks. Methods were developed and implemented for the testing of plant products, as well as animal tissues.
- Pandemic influenza preparedness and response activities during 2005–2010 resulted in facilitating relationships for sharing of detection/monitoring assays (H5N1, H1N1, and sub-typing panel), as well as reciprocity testing policy for supporting surge capacity demands between civilian public health and military clinical laboratories participating in the LRN-Biological (LRN-B).
- Other collaborative work against priority biological agents has resulted in memorandums of understanding for coordination between CDC/LRN and FERN and the Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN) to clarify roles in weapons of mass destruction scenarios capable of causing widespread disease via inhalation and ingestion.

Since the ICLN was created in 2005, work has been completed on several fronts to improve the posture of the ICLN member laboratory response networks toward their integrated mission as outlined by the original 2005 MOA. A listing of benefits includes:

- Enhanced environmental analytical capability for chemical warfare agents;
- Development of an interagency strategy for radiological capability enhancement;
- Establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ERLN and the Department of Defense (DoD) Laboratory Network (DLN);

- Improved surge planning and resource distribution based on the 2007 ICLN Capability Assessment;
- Improved strategic planning outcomes based on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terrorism risk assessments;
- Development of a Methods Validation Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which broadly informed assay performance and "fitness for purpose" across networks;
- Generally improved communications to promote understanding of respective Networks' needs and pressures;
- Creation of a chain-of-custody form for member agencies to utilize when evidence is transferred among any individuals who handle the evidence;
- Initiation of sampling procedure guidelines;
- Development of a Methods Matrix, comprising methods used by member laboratory networks; and
- Creation of an Integrated Response Architecture and SOP, supported by a collaborative Web portal, to enable joint response of ICLN member laboratory networks to major contamination or public health events.

III. PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT

The purpose of this Agreement is to set out the Federal relationships within the ICLN to ensure an information-sharing structure, as well as to describe the commitments undertaken by the signatories. This Agreement acknowledges that significant national laboratory testing capacity is derived from utilization of established laboratory networks such as the FERN, the LRN, the NAHLN, the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN), the ERLN, the DLN, and networks within the Federal Departments and Agencies with responsibilities and authorities for laboratory preparedness and response (collectively referred to as "the networks"). This agreement respects the existing relationships, policies, and operating procedures of these networks or any similar interconnected group of laboratories whose relationships involve Federal funding, direction, or other cooperative arrangements.

This Agreement immediately terminates and replaces the previous Agreement executed in full in December 2005.

The signatories may have separate authorities and distinct laboratory missions, based in part upon the various types of samples they test (e.g., human, animal, plant, food, and environment), the types of agents they test for (e.g., microbial, toxicological, radiological, and chemical), and the types of laboratories involved (e.g., screening/sentinel, confirmatory, definitive/reference, and forensic). Although the signatories recognize that participation in the ICLN does not require them to allow access to their respective facilities or expertise, this agreement reflects their intent to work cooperatively to optimize national laboratory preparedness and provide mutual support wherever possible, consistent with applicable authorities and funding restrictions, as noted below.

Additional Federal Departments and Agencies may join this Agreement in the future.

IV. AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS

A. Each of the signatories will conduct activities under this Agreement within the scope of, and to the extent authorized by, their existing statutory authorities.

B. Participating in the ICLN to strengthen early detection and coordinated consequence management is consistent with the policy direction contained in Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 9, 10, 21, and 22.

C. This Agreement is an agreement among the signatories, including components of the signatories' organizations, and does not create or confer any right or benefit on any other person or party, private or public. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to restrict the authority of any signatory to act as provided by law or regulation, or to restrict any Department or Agency from enforcing any laws within its authority or jurisdiction.

D. All commitments arising from this Agreement are subject to each signatory's budget priorities and the availability and limitations on the use of appropriated funds for such purposes. If any signatories, or representatives of components of signatories' organizations, determine it would be appropriate to utilize each other's network capacity, they may enter into any further necessary agreements or arrangements in accordance with the Economy Act or other applicable laws, regulations, and procedures. However, nothing in this Agreement obligates any of the signatories to expend appropriations or to enter into any contract, assistance agreement, or interagency agreement or arrangement, or to incur other financial obligations.

E. Nothing in this Agreement supersedes information-sharing requirements in U.S. laws or regulations. If necessary and appropriate to further this Agreement, signatories or representatives of components of signatories' organizations may enter into information-sharing agreements.

F. Nothing in this Agreement impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the heads of the signatory organizations over the organizations, including, in the case of the Department of Defense, the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commands and Military Departments, or military command and control procedures.

V. ORGANIZATION

A. As outlined in the 2008 ICLN Charge and Charter, the focal point of network coordination is the Network Coordinating Group (NCG), comprising the member

response network coordinators with a DHS chair. Also chaired by DHS, the Joint Leadership Council (JLC) comprises senior leaders of the member Departments and Agencies and provides oversight and periodic strategic guidance to the NCG. These two groups are supported by a DHS Executive Secretariat (ES). As it deems advisable and necessary, the NCG may establish subordinate Subgroups to assist in development of process and procedures, as well as the assimilation of technical information required to meet ICLN objectives.

B. The ICLN comprises the following member organizations:
    1. Department of Agriculture
        i. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
            a) Plant Protection and Quarantine
            b) Veterinary Services
        ii. Food Safety and Inspection Service
        iii. National Institute for Food and Agriculture
    2. Department of Defense
        i. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
        ii. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
        iii. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    3. Department of Energy
        i. National Nuclear Security Administration
    4. Department of Health and Human Services
        i. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
        ii. Food and Drug Administration
    5. Department of Homeland Security
        i. Office of Health Affairs
        ii. Science and Technology Directorate
    6. Environmental Protection Agency
        i. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response: Office of Emergency Management
        ii. Office of Water: Office of Groundwater and Drinking Water
        iii. Office of Air and Radiation: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
        iv. Office of the Administrator: Office of Homeland Security
        v. Office of Research and Development: National Homeland Security Research Center

C. The aforementioned ICLN partner networks also recognize and collaborate with the following important stakeholders:
    1. Department of Commerce
    2. Department of the Interior
    3. Department of Justice
        i. Federal Bureau of Investigation
    4. Department of State

D. The **Joint Leadership Council** (JLC) provides advice and advocacy to senior Federal Government leaders with the objective of aligning and supporting an appropriate strategy and requisite funding with appropriate consideration of capability gaps in effective laboratory testing for detection and response to health and national security emergencies.
    1. Each signatory from the member organizations intends to designate a single JLC representative for the respective organization with the ability to obtain decisions regarding budgets and policies. The designated representative should meet at least biannually with the NCG-level designee of that organization. The JLC representative will make provisions for a responsible alternate designee to ensure continuity on issues and presence at all meetings. At the discretion of the JLC, additional senior representatives from a signatory organization may accompany the designee to JLC meetings.
    2. The JLC is to be chaired by the DHS Office of Health Affairs representative to the JLC and will be supported by the Executive Secretariat.
    3. The JLC:
        i. Guides the ICLN in systemwide strategic planning through the NCG;
        ii. Promotes coordinated initiatives and implementation thereof, consistent with applicable authorities and funding restrictions of signatory organizations;
        iii. Makes recommendations on issues elevated by the NCG in the best interest of the ICLN as a whole;
        iv. Approves inclusion of additional networks into the ICLN and modifications to this Agreement; and
        v. Meets at least annually to review ICLN strategic plans and to support coordinated Federal budget development.

E. The **Network Coordinating Group** (NCG) develops and proposes policies and procedures and helps carry out the operations of the ICLN through a close and formal working relationship among the operational leadership of the individual networks and the other involved parties.
    1. Each of the signatories intends to support one or more senior representatives who have:
        i. Authority to obtain Network decisions and decisions on the commitment of resources rapidly;
        ii. Knowledge of laboratory practices and testing capacity; network operations; and policies and emergency response practices;
        iii. Knowledge of interagency government systems and stakeholder concerns;
        iv. Strong collaboration skills; and
        v. Sufficient technical support from their organization, including staff support, to execute his or her responsibilities effectively.
    2. The NCG meetings are to be chaired by DHS.

3. The NCG is to operate by consensus agreement among members. If agreement cannot be achieved, the issue may be presented to the JLC for consideration and resolution, when appropriate.
4. The NCG:
    i. Ensures timely communications among all member organizations.
    ii. Establishes the common operating procedures of the ICLN (e.g., notification and reporting guidance) for timely, high-quality, and interpretable results.
    iii. Helps ensure coordination for effective agent prioritization; appropriate analytic methods for high-quality, timely, and interpretable results; proficiency testing, quality assurance, and accreditation of participating laboratory testing entities; training across networks; information management, including data exchange and knowledge management; and that legal and ethical issues relevant to the functioning of the networks are referred to appropriate legal and ethical advisors.
    iv. Develops and proposes a comprehensive laboratory network strategic plan that enables the integration of the networks.
    v. Establishes the agenda for, and supports the effective operation of, the JLC.
    vi. Helps ensure the ICLN has appropriate relationships to, and alignment with, the National Response Framework.
5. The NCG is to establish and guide ICLN subgroups in support of its role to:
    i. Create standardized and integrated approaches for the ICLN;
    ii. Promote conservation of resources;
    iii. Address critical issues affecting the reliability of data provided to decisionmakers;
    iv. Provide an initial analysis and ongoing advice and coordination; and
    v. Serve as a forum for the discussion and dissemination of information; and
    vi. Address any other relevant issue areas deemed appropriate by the NCG Chair.
6. The NCG may consult with other Federal organizations in support of its work.

F. The **Executive Secretariat** (ES) has dedicated staff to support the organizational structure of the ICLN (JLC, NCG, and Subgroups). Oversight of the ES is to be provided by the NCG Chair. DHS intends to staff and support the ES. The size of the ES is to be determined by DHS and should include a senior Executive Secretary and will be sufficient to meet the administrative needs of the ICLN, including inter-network communications, convening meetings, facilitating actions approved during meetings, and serving as the point of contact for external outreach and communications.

G. Permanent and ad hoc **Subgroups** support decisions of the NCG by providing consultation on matters before the NCG.
    1. Subject matter experts from government (Federal, State, and local), academia, professional organizations, and business may provide technical support as appropriate and determined by the NCG. The need for subordinate groups is to be determined by the NCG. Subgroups are to be chaired by Federal staff within the response laboratory network system, who may be assisted by individuals enlisted via contract to provide specific technical support services to the Federal Government.
    2. The Subgroups review key issues and requirements of the networks (e.g., agent prioritization, methods development and standards, proficiency testing, quality assurance, accreditation, information management, forensic analysis, and external outreach) and devise recommendations for operational or policy choices.
    3. Provision of technical input by non-Federal personnel will be conducted in a manner that will not require the establishment of a Federal advisory committee and that will comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and will otherwise be consistent with Federal practice on the solicitation and receipt of such input.

H. The **Responsible Federal Agencies** (RFAs), where responsibility is agreed to, and subject to their authorities and funding restrictions, support the operational capacity of the individual networks to meet their testing requirements for monitoring, incident response, forensic analysis, and incident remediation and recovery, including longer duration surge requirements for events of extended recovery periods. RFAs work through the existing laboratory networks, whose laboratory members may be components of State, local, or other Federal agency jurisdictions.
    1. Identification as an RFA is recommended by the NCG in accordance with Agency missions and authorities. This identification should cover all relevant agents (e.g., chemical, biologic, and radiological), specimen types (e.g., human clinical, environmental, food, animal, and plant), and operational phases (e.g., monitoring, incident response, forensic analysis, and incident remediation and recovery) for which the ICLN assumes responsibility.
    2. RFAs are to make decisions in accordance with their existing authorities. Agreements between member organizations are to be made operational by the RFA, where appropriate.
    3. The RFA's commitment for timely, high-quality, and interpretable laboratory results, in accordance with its authorities, is met through:
        i. Prioritization of agents that will be tested for in a given specimen type and operational phase;
        ii. Sponsoring research and development of testing methods and promoting standardization where appropriate;
        iii. Conducting proficiency testing, quality assurance, and laboratory accreditation at or above the standards set by the ICLN;

iv. Designing and implementing laboratory training and sampling guidance;
v. Deploying information systems and supporting the timely exchange and appropriate management of information across Networks;
vi. Addressing and ensuring compliance with legal, ethical, privacy, and safety standards appropriate for the RFA, network, and the ICLN; and
vii. Collaboration and written agreements with laboratories and other stakeholders to establish roles and relationships to meet testing requirements and help ensure there are adequate resources to support the network to carry out its assigned role.

4. RFAs intend to use those RFA staff and resources routinely used to meet network responsibilities, to be directed through ICLN mechanisms where possible, and supplemental staff and resources for new integration activities, consistent with authorities and funding restrictions.
5. The signatories recognize that not all of these capabilities exist for all RFAs in all potential designated areas. Where they do not exist, the signatories commit to assist each other as appropriate in developing network coverage, consistent with existing authorities and funding restrictions.

I. The **ICLN Member Networks**

The ICLN addresses the need to provide a coordinated and interoperational system of laboratory networks to support the U.S. homeland security infrastructure. Working in collaboration, the ICLN's participating laboratory response networks are capable of an integrated and coordinated response to incidents involving multiple types of agents (chemical, biological, radiological, and unknowns) or matrices (clinical, environmental, food, plant, and animal), affecting more than one segment of the Nation (humans, animals, plants, food, and the environment), and which require multiple phases of incident management. Each network is described in further detail in the following paragraphs.

ERLN – The Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN) is managed by EPA. The ERLN consists of Federal, State, and commercial laboratories that focus on responding quickly to an environmental chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist attack, as well as natural disasters affecting human health and the environment. ERLN presently has one hundred thirty laboratories. The ERLN works in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), USDA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), DoD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during an incident. The ERLN provides analytical support for characterizing the extent and degree of contamination in environmental media during response and remediation activities. The ERLN also has the primary role in the analysis of

drinking water and wastewater. In October 2009, the ERLN initiated its Phase Two rollout, which included additional public and private sector laboratories.

FERN – The Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) is managed by USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the FDA. Laboratories participating in FERN at the Federal, State, and local level are responsible for detecting and identifying biological, chemical, and radiological agents in food. FERN presently has 171 laboratories within its membership. This includes 39 Federal (including DoD) laboratories, 115 State/territory/university laboratories, and 17 local laboratories. The primary objectives of FERN are to help prevent attacks on the food supply through utilization of targeted food surveillance; prepare for emergencies by strengthening laboratory capabilities to respond to threats, attacks, and emergencies in the food supply; and to assist in recovery from such an incident. Targeted surveillance is the random selection of food commodities within various agency programs that are tested for threat agents. Program commodities could include, but are not limited to, imports, school lunch programs, and special events such as political conventions, major sporting events, or other events where large or high-profile groups of people are gathered. Some FERN laboratories are also responsible for method development and validation.

LRN – HHS CDC manages the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). This includes the CDC LRN-Biological (LRN-B) and CDC LRN-Chemical (LRN-C). LRN-B presently has 156 member laboratories (three National laboratories and 153 reference laboratories). LRN-C has 62 member laboratories (ten Level 1 laboratories (these have the highest capability for detecting exposure to chemicals), 37 Level 2 laboratories, and 15 Level 3 laboratories). The LRN was established pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39. It is a joint effort among HHS CDC, DoJ, FBI, the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), and DoD. The LRN became operational in October 1999. The mission of the LRN is "to maintain an integrated national and international network of laboratories that are fully equipped to respond quickly to acts of chemical and biological terrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and other public health threats and emergencies."

NAHLN – The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) was established by the USDA's Homeland Security Office as part of a national strategy to coordinate the testing capacities of the Federal veterinary diagnostic laboratories with those of the State and university veterinary diagnostic laboratories, which have extensive infrastructure (facilities, professional expertise, and support). The NAHLN is a partnership of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), as well as the American Association

of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD). The network's purpose is to enhance the Nation's early detection of, response to, and recovery from, animal health emergencies, including bioterrorist incidents, newly emerging diseases, and foreign animal disease (FAD) agents that threaten the Nation's food supply and public health. Laboratories associated with NAHLN include two APHIS veterinary laboratories (Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, New York), 58 State and university laboratories located throughout 44 States, and two additional Federal laboratories (Department of Interior in Madison, Wisconsin, and USDA, Food Safety Inspection Service in Athens, Georgia).

NPDN – The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) is managed by USDA's NIFA and APHIS. The NPDN was established by the USDA Homeland Security Office to develop a link among academic plant disease diagnostic laboratories across the country. The mission of NPDN is to enhance national agricultural security through rapid detection, diagnosis, and early communication of outbreaks of potentially damaging pests of food, feed, fiber, fuel crops, and forest trees. NPDN is designed to quickly detect and identify high-consequence pests and pathogens introduced—deliberately or accidentally—into commercial and natural ecosystems and to report them to appropriate responders and decisionmakers. The network collaborates with county and State extension agents, State departments of agriculture, and USDA's APHIS' Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) during outbreaks and for implementation of its mission. The NPDN laboratory system consists of five regional laboratories (Northeast Region, Great Plains Region, North Central Region, Western Region, and Southern Region) with access to 60 nationally distributed NPDN member support laboratories, which include State or territory department of agriculture and the university public plant diagnostic clinics, and is coordinated with APHIS PPQ regional and confirmatory diagnostic laboratories as well as the Center for Plant Health Science and Technology (CPHST)/National Plant Germplasm and Biotechnology Laboratory (NPGBL) for national response to a plant health emergency.

DLN – The DoD Laboratory Network's (DLN's) proponents within the Office of the Secretary of Defense are the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The specific offices within the above Under Secretaries' organizational structure that provide oversight of DLN operations are the Offices of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, respectively. The DLN is a coordinated and operational system of DoD laboratories, programs, and activities possessing analytic and/or incident response capabilities that provides timely, high-quality, actionable results for early detection, confirmation, and effective

consequence management of acts of terrorism or warfare involving CBRN agents, infectious disease agents, and other all-hazards agents of military significance in support of the DoD global mission and homeland defense. In accordance with applicable laws governing DoD and the Federal Government, the DLN provides support to civil authorities and participates in ICLN integrated incident responses.

VI. COMMITMENTS OF THE SIGNATORIES

A. The member organizations shall identify and provide a representative with the ability to obtain decisions rapidly for the JLC.

B. To support a representative to the NCG with the ability to obtain decisions rapidly for the NCG and who is knowledgeable of laboratory practices and testing capacity; network operations; policies and emergency response practices; and interagency government systems and stakeholder concerns.

C. To support the other signatories to this agreement in carrying out their Responsible Federal Agency obligations consistent with authorities and funding restrictions.

D. Furthermore, DHS agrees to support the operations of the ICLN by staffing the Executive Secretariat, whose responsibilities are described herein.

VII. EXECUTION, MODIFICATION, TERMINATION, AND FUNDING

This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will be deemed to be an original, and, all of which, taken together, will constitute one Agreement. Upon execution and delivery of a counterpart signature page hereto by any entity indicated as a signatory on the signature pages of this Agreement, such entity will become a party to this Agreement. The execution and delivery of a counterpart signature page will not require the consent of any participant that has already consented.

Any participant in this Agreement may propose modifications to this Agreement. No modification will be effective until approved in writing by all signatories on this Agreement. However, any participant in this Agreement may terminate its participation herein at any time. If appropriate to do so, signatories will provide 90 days of written notice to the other participants. The Agreement will terminate on July 31, 2016.

The activities under this Agreement are subject to the availability of funds.

Memorandum of Agreement
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)

NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned agree to sustain and support an integrated system of laboratory networks to assist in responding to acts of terrorism and other events requiring an integrated laboratory response by fulfilling their responsibilities as part of the ICLN structure as described in this Agreement.

Thomas J. Vilsack
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

12/1/11
Date

Ashton B. Carter
Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Department of Defense

Date

Joseph J. Krol
Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations
National Nuclear Security Administration
Department of Energy

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Dr. Nicole Lurie
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
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Assistant Secretary for Office of Health Affairs
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Tom Vilsack
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

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Frank Kendall
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Department of Defense

11/18/11
Date

Joseph J. Krol
Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations
National Nuclear Security Administration
Department of Energy

Date

Dr. Nicole Lurie
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
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Date

Dr. Alexander Garza
Assistant Secretary for Office of Health Affairs
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Department of Defense

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DEC - 6 2011
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Dr. Alexander Garza
Assistant Secretary for Office of Health Affairs
Department of Homeland Security

10 Nov 2011
Date

Tara O'Toole — 8/8/11

Dr. Tara O'Toole
Under Secretary for Science and Technology
Department of Homeland Security

Date

Lisa P. Jackson
Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency

Date

Ken Salazar
Secretary
Department of the Interior

Date

Dr. David C. Hassell
Assistant Director for the FBI Laboratory Division
Department of Justice

Date

Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State

Date

Dr. Tara O'Toole
Under Secretary for Science and Technology
Department of Homeland Security

Date

Deborah Y. Dietrich

10-21-11

Deborah Dietrich
Associate Administrator
Office of Homeland Security
Environmental Protection Agency

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Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
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1/26/12
Date

Appendix: ICLN Organizational Structure